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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment certified under 
Rule 54(b) by the Fifth District Court, James L. Shumate, 
presiding, as a final judgment on all issues and all claims between 
the plaintiffs and Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart"). 
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. What is the extent of vicarious liability imposed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-308 on a title insurance company for the acts 
of its agent? Specifically, in the instant case, is Stewart 
vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308 for First Title's failure to 
warn plaintiffs of possible improprieties by plaintiffs' partner, 
Vernon George? 
This issue was raised by the twenty-third cause of action in 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and was addressed in Stewart's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 610; 
297; R. 585.] The standard of review is for correctness. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991). 
2. To what extent is a title insurance company liable at 
common law for the acts of its limited agent which are unrelated to 
the issuance of title insurance policies? Specifically, in the 
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instant case, is Stewart vicariously liable at common law for the 
acts of First Title in the escrows, settlements and closings at 
issue? 
This issue was raised by the twenty-third cause of action in 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and was addressed in Stewart's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 610; R. 
297; R. 585.] The standard of review is for correctness. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-23-3 08 and 31A-23-3 05 are determinative 
on this appeal. These statutory provisions are set forth in the 
addendum to this brief, Exhibit 1. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case arises from disputes among partners in two real 
estate development companies over the purchase and sale of real 
estate located in southwestern Utah. The transactions involved 
several projects that were either purchased or sold beginning in 
June, 1992 and ending during the summer of 1993. Most of the 
escrow closings and issuance of title policies were handled by 
First Title of Utah, Inc. ("First Title"). 
Instead of bringing claims only against their partner in the 
development companies who allegedly defrauded them, plaintiffs sued 
nearly everyone who ever had anything to do with the projects in 
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which the plaintiffs were involved, including Stewart. Stewart's 
only connection was that its title insurance policies were issued 
to the development companies on their projects closed through First 
Title. 
Stewart moved the court for summary judgment in June of 1996. 
[R. 280.] The motion was argued before the Fifth District Court, 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding, in August, 1996. Judge 
Shumate granted Stewart's motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that Stewart, as a matter of law, was not liable to the 
plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305 or 308 or under a 
common law agency theory of liability. Judge Shumate certified the 
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and plaintiffs appealed. [R. 656.] 
' STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Stewart Title Guaranty Company is a title insurance 
company. First Title of Utah, Inc. is Stewart's agent for the 
limited purpose of issuing title insurance policies and 
commitments. First Title's authority to act as an agent on behalf 
of Stewart is governed by a document entitled "Amendment to Title 
Insurance Underwriting Agreement" dated July 1, 1984 ("Agency 
Agreement") executed by Stewart, as principal underwriter, and 
Plaintiffs did not rely on any disputed material facts in 
responding to Stewart's motion for summary judgment nor do 
plaintiffs claim the existence of any disputed material facts in 
their appellate brief. 
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First Title, as agent. [Arlen Taylor affidavit 11 5, 6 and 
attached Exhibit A; R. 283.] The Agency Agreement provides: 
In consideration of the mutual agreements 
expressed herein, UNDERWRITER [Stewart] 
appoints COMPANY [First Title] as its agent to 
execute title policies in the name of 
UNDERWRITER with the authority, duties, 
limitations and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement. Title policies, as the term is 
used in this Agreement, shall include all 
contracts of title insurance or guaranty, 
including title insurance policies, 
endorsements, binders and commitments. 
[Taylor affidavit, Exhibit A, R. 283.] First Title is expressly 
forbidden by the Agency Agreement to represent itself as an agent 
for Stewart in the escrow business: 
Although Company may conduct an escrow 
business, Company shall not represent to the 
public that it is an agent of Underwriter in 
the conduct of the escrow business. 
[Taylor affidavit 11 4, 8 and attached Exhibit A, 1 8, R. 283.] 
Under the Agency Agreement, Stewart is only entitled to fees 
generated by First Title's issuance of Stewart title insurance 
policies and is not entitled to any fees generated by First Title's 
escrow, settlement or closing activities. [Taylor affidavit, 
Exhibit A, 1 11, R. 283 .] 
2. In February of 1992, Vernon George ("George") and The 
Rosemont Corporation ("Rosemont") entered into an option to 
purchase the Fly-In L D Ranch (the "Ranch") from Angela Drews 
("Drews"). [Second Amended Complaint, 1 8, R.610.] Rosemont is a 
California corporation allegedly under the control of George. 
[Second Amended Complaint, 1 1, R. 610.] The purchase price of the 
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Ranch under the option was $1.6 million. [Second Amended 
Complaint, f 8, R. 610] . George paid Drews $10,000 for the option 
to purchase the Ranch on February 17, 1992. [Michael Bodell 
deposition at 30, 31 and Exhibit 3.] On February 22, 1992, an 
addendum to the Ranch purchase option was executed which stated 
that the purchase price for the Ranch would be $1.8 million and 
that Rosemont would receive a commission of $250,000 upon the 
closing of the Ranch sale. [Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 7.] 
On April 22, 1992, George paid an additional $35,000 to Drews to 
lease the Ranch from April 30, 1992, until August 22, 1992, or 
until the date that the February purchase option was terminated, 
whichever came first. [Michael Bodell deposition at 31 and Exhibit 
6.] Both the $10,000 option payment and the $35,000 lease payment 
were to be applied to the purchase price of the Ranch. [Michael 
Bodell deposition at 30, 31 and Exhibit 4.] On June 3, 1992, 
George assigned Rosemont's commission on the Ranch sale "toward the 
Purchase Price" of the Ranch [Robert Elliott deposition at 23-24 
and Exhibit 43; Michael Bodell deposition at 34 ] 
3. Around March of 1992, the individual plaintiffs, James 
Bodell and Michael Bodell, were introduced to George by Floyd I 
Helm ("Helm") . Helm is a realtor licensed by the State of Utah and 
is an agent of The Property Shoppe, Inc , a Utah corporation Helm 
told the plaintiffs that George was "looking for a partner" to 
participate in George's purchase of the Ranch. [Second Amended 
Complaint, 1 9, R 610 ] 
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4. George advised Michael Bodell, one of the plaintiffs, 
that the lowest price the Ranch could be purchased for was $1.8 
million. [Second Amended Complaint, 1 10, R. 610.] On June 8, 
1992, the Ranch was sold for $1.8 million to Cedar Creek Ranch, 
L.C. ("Cedar Creek"). [Second Amended Complaint, 1 49, R. 610.] 
Cedar Creek was a development company formed by plaintiffs and 
George. [Second Amended Complaint, % 49, R. 610.] 
5. At the closing of the Ranch sale, which was handled by 
First Title, plaintiffs contributed $377,700 in cash to the Ranch 
purchase. George, in turn, deposited a cashier's check for 
$100,000 with First Title. First Title also received a wire 
transfer of $288,000 from an entity called Melrose Escrow for the 
Ranch purchase. [Michael Bodell deposition at 29-35 and 
Exhibits 49, 52.] Melrose Escrow is an entity allegedly affiliated 
with George. [Michael Bodell deposition at 32, 33.] Finally, as 
indicated above, George had previously applied Rosemont's 
commission to the purchase of the Ranch. No funds were ever 
deposited with First Title for Rosemont's commission. [Second 
Amended Complaint, H 15, R. 610.] First Title did not disburse any 
funds to Rosemont or George in connection with Rosemont's sales 
commission on the Ranch. Rather, the commission appeared on Cedar 
Creek's buyer's closing statement as part of a "credit" to Cedar 
Creek, along with the $45,000 George had previously paid to Drews 
for the purchase option and to lease the Ranch. [Robert Elliott 
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deposition at 23-24 and Exhibits 43, 46; Second Amended Complaint 
13, R. 610.] 
6. Subsequent to the acquisition of the Ranch, Cedar Creek 
undertook to develop and market lots in the Ranch. Before sales of 
lots could be made, Cedar Creek was required by the State of Utah 
to establish an escrow for on-site improvements (the "Improvement 
Escrow"). [Second Amended Complaint, f 50, R. 610.] The 
Improvement Escrow was to be established at First Title from 
capital contributed by George. [Second Amended Complaint, f 51, 
R. 610.] First Title's obligation with respect to the Improvement 
Escrow was to disburse funds deposited by George in the Improvement 
Escrow to third parties who made improvements on the Ranch. 
[Robert Elliott deposition at 56, 57 and Exhibits 54-56.] George 
gave personal checks to First Title for the Improvement Escrow but 
these checks bounced when deposited by First Title. [First Title 
Answer, % 52, R. 95; Kathryn Elliott deposition at 38, 40.] As a 
result, George ultimately never funded the Improvement Escrow. 
[Second Amended Complaint, % 55, R. 610.] Although a title policy 
was issued on the purchase of the ranch, and on the later sales of 
various ranch lots, no policy or commitment was issued in 
connection with the Ranch Improvement Escrow. 
7. Plaintiffs also claim to have been defrauded by George in 
a transaction involving a parcel of property in what is referred to 
as the East Ridge project. [Pltfs.' Brief at 17.] On one of the 
parcels in the East Ridge project, First Title conducted two 
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closings on July 27, 1993. [Second Amended Complaint, % 127, 
R. 610.] In the first closing, the purchaser was River Road, L.C. 
("River Road") and the purchase price was $75,000.00. [Second 
Amended Complaint, U 131, R. 610; Michael Bodell deposition, 
Exhibit 88.] River Road is a company allegedly under the control 
of George. [Pltfs.' Brief at 14.] River Road paid $28.36 toward 
this purchase and the remaining balance, together with fees owed to 
First Title, was due to the seller. [Michael Bodell deposition, 
Exhibit 88.] In the second closing, River Road sold the parcel to 
Clear Creek Development, L.C. ("Clear Creek") and the purchase 
price was $90,000.00. [Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 90.] 
Clear Creek is a development company formed by plaintiffs and 
George. In this second closing, the plaintiffs paid $75,061.64. 
A $15,000 credit was given to Clear Creek toward the $90,000 
purchase price. [Second Amended Complaint f 131, R. 610.] This 
credit was characterized as a "down payment" received by the 
seller. [Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 90.] On July 1, 19937 
George had earlier given River Road a $15,000 earnest money deposit 
on the parcel. [Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 91.] 
Plaintiffs claim to have been injured because this transaction 
allegedly created "phantom equity" for George in the Eastridge 
project. [Second Amended Complaint 1JH 128, 129, R. 610.] 
8. Finally, in January, 1993, George and Bodell agreed to 
purchase an approved but uncompleted subdivision in St. George, 
Utah ("Lava Pointe") for development purposes through a limited 
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liability company. [Second Amended Complaint, UK 72, 74, 75, 
R. 610]. In May, 1993, George and Bodell agreed to purchase a 
second part of Lava Pointe (Lava Pointe II) . [Second Amended 
Complaint, % 81, R. 610] . The sales agent for both the Lava Pointe 
and Lava Pointe II purchases was a company known as Rredco Realty. 
[Second Amended Complaint, K 82, R. 610.] At the closing of Lava 
Pointe II, pursuant to instructions from Rredco Realty, First Title 
paid part of Rredco Realty's sales commission to third parties. 
[Second Amended Complaint, f 91, R. 610; Robert Elliott deposition 
at 78-80, 86, 88, 89.] Plaintiffs do not dispute that Rredco 
Realty was entitled to the commission. Plaintiffs claim only that 
Rredco should not have paid a portion of the commission to third 
parties who plaintiffs allege are creditors of George, and that 
First Title should not have followed Rredco's instruction to do so. 
9. Stewart never made any representations to plaintiffs that 
First Title was Stewart's agent for escrow, closing or settlement 
business. During all of the above-mentioned transactions, 
plaintiffs never had any contact with Stewart whatsoever, and 
particularly never contacted Stewart to find out what authority 
First Title had to conduct business on behalf of Stewart: 
Q. Okay. Have you ever talked to anyone at Stewart 
Title. 
A. No. 
Q. Related to these transactions? 
A. No. 
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Q. Have you ever corresponded with anyone at Stewart Title 
related to these transactions? 
A. No. 
[Michael Bodell deposition at 367-368.] 
10. Stewart's only involvement in the above transactions was 
to underwrite the title insurance policies issued by First Title in 
its capacity as Stewart's limited agent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Stewart is not liable, as a matter of law, under § 31A-23-308, 
§ 31A-23-305, or under a common law theory of agency liability. 
Section 31A-23-308 makes title companies liable only for "the 
receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, closings or 
settlements with the title insurance agents . . . . " The funds 
received and/or disbursed by First Title in the transactions at 
issue were not misallocated, misdirected, embezzled or otherwise 
dealt with improperly by First Title. First Title received and 
disbursed funds exactly as directed in the various escrows, 
settlements and closings. Because First Title received and 
disbursed funds as directed by the parties to the transactions, 
Stewart is not vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308 as a matter of 
law. 
Likewise, Stewart is not liable under § 31A-23-305 or a common 
law agency theory of liability. The scope of First Title's agency 
authority, as defined by its underwriting agreement with Stewart, 
was specifically limited to issuing Stewart title insurance 
policies. Plaintiffs' claims against Stewart for vicarious 
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liability arise out of the escrow, settlement or closing 
transactions handled by First Title, and not out of First Title's 
issuance of Stewart title insurance policies. Consequently, 
Stewart is not liable, as a matter of law, under § 31A-23-305 or a 
common law agency theory of liability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23-308 BECAUSE FIRST TITLE'S ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE "RECEIPT AND DISBURSEMENT 
OF FUNDS DEPOSITED IN ESCROWS, CLOSINGS, OR SETTLEMENTS" WITH 
FIRST TITLE AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE. 
Stewart is not liable to plaintiffs, as a matter of law, for 
the alleged misconduct of First Title under § 31A-23-308. Section 
31A-23-308 of the Utah Code provides that: 
Any title company, represented by one or more title 
insurance agents, is directly and primarily liable 
to others dealing with the title insurance agents 
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited 
in escrows, closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions where a 
commitment or binder for or policy or contract of 
title insurance of that title insurance company has 
been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title 
insurance company has been issued or distributed. 
This liability does not modify, mitigate, impair, 
or affect the contractual obligations between the 
title insurance agents and the title insurance 
company. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308 (1996) . Resolution of plaintiffs' 
claims under this statute turns on proper statutory analysis. When 
interpreting a Utah statute, a court should first look to the plain 
language of the statute. Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995); State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
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Plaintiffs contend that § 31A-23-308 imposes liability on 
title insurance companies "for the escrow, settlement and closing 
services" of their agents. [Pltfs.' Brief at 27.] Plaintiffs' 
argument ignores the plain language of the statute. Even assuming 
that § 31A-23-308 applies to title insurance companies such as 
Stewart,2 nothing in the statute states that a title insurance 
company is liable for all acts of its limited agent. Rather, the 
statute makes title insurance companies liable, if at all, only for 
their agent's receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in 
escrow, closing and settlement transactions. 
First Title did exactly as instructed with all funds deposited 
with it. Plaintiffs have not alleged, and there is no evidence, 
that First Title embezzled or misallocated funds or engaged in any 
other improper conduct in receiving and disbursing funds deposited 
in the escrows, closings, or settlements at issue. In their 
appellate brief, plaintiffs identify five acts of alleged 
"wrongdoing" by First Title for which plaintiffs claim Stewart 
should be held vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308. None of 
2The plain language of § 31A-23-308 indicates that § 31A-23-
308 only applies to "title companies." While the issue was not 
raised at the trial court hearing on Stewart's motion for summary 
judgment, Stewart has denied that it is a title company within the 
meaning of § 31A-23-308. [Stewart Answer to Complaint 1 5, R. 80.] 
Title companies, such as First Title, commonly provide escrow, 
settlement and closing services, and also frequently conduct title 
searches, prepare title insurance commitments and issue title 
insurance policies on the behalf of title insurance companies. 
Title insurance companies underwrite the title insurance policies 
issued by title companies. Stewart is a title insurance company, 
not a title company. Section 31A-23-308 on its face, therefore, 
does not apply to Stewart. 
286598 1 12 
these acts involves receipt or disbursement of funds deposited in 
escrow with First Title. 
First, plaintiffs claim that First Title issued a title 
insurance policy on the Fly-In LD Ranch for $ 1.6 million instead 
of $1.8 million. [Pltfs.' Brief at 17.] This claim obviously does 
not involve receipt or disbursement of funds. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs do not claim that this violated any contract, breached 
any duty, or caused any harm to plaintiffs. 
Second, plaintiffs claim to have been injured in the Fly-In LD 
Ranch purchase because George, through Rosemont, was given a 
"kickback commission" on the Ranch sale. Id.3 This commission 
does not implicate First Title's receipt or disbursement of funds 
deposited with it in escrow. As indicated above, pursuant to an 
agreement with the seller, George, through Rosemont, was given a 
$250,000 commission on the Ranch sale. Before the closing on the 
Ranch, however, George assigned this commission "toward the 
Purchase Price" of the Ranch. First Title did not receive any 
money in escrow or at the closing of the Ranch sale for payment of 
Rosemont's commission. No money was disbursed to Rosemont as 
payment of the commission. Rather, the commission was merely 
3Plaintiffs claim that First Title manipulated closing 
statements to "mask" George's commission on the Ranch sale. The 
closing statement that plaintiffs claim to have discovered 
subsequent to the trial court's granting Stewart's motion for 
summary judgment, however, does in fact disclose that $250,000 was 
being credited to Cedar Creek's purchase of the Ranch as a 
"Commission credited to Buyer [Cedar Creek] at closing." [Pltfs.' 
Brief, Exhibit 2.] 
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credited to Cedar Creek by the seller at the Ranch sale closing. 
Plaintiffs do not claim, and there simply is no evidence, that 
First Title misallocated, misdirected, embezzled or otherwise dealt 
improperly with any of the funds it actually received or disbursed 
in the Ranch sale closing. 
Third, plaintiffs claim that First Title conducted a "double 
escrow" on one of the parcels at the Eastridge project which 
resulted in plaintiffs paying an "inflated purchase price." 
[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.] As indicated above, the alleged "double 
escrow" merely involved two closings on a parcel at the Eastridge 
project. In one closing, an entity controlled by George, River 
Road, purchased the parcel for $75,000. In the second closing, 
Clear Creek, a development company formed by plaintiffs and George, 
purchased the parcel for $90,000. Plaintiffs contributed 
$75,061.54 to the purchase price of the parcel in the second 
closing. A down payment credit was given to Clear Creek by River 
Road in the closing in the amount of $15,000. George had earlier 
placed a $15,000 earnest money deposit with River Road on the 
parcel on July 1, 1993. Similar to the credit given Cedar Creek in 
the Ranch closing, no funds were deposited with First Title to 
establish this credit on behalf of Clear Creek. Again, plaintiffs' 
claims for injury rest on George's allegedly creating "phantom 
equity" for himself in the project. Plaintiffs do not claim, and 
there is no evidence, that any funds actually deposited with First 
Title were received or disbursed improperly. 
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Fourth, plaintiffs claim that First Title represented to the 
State of Utah and to buyers of lots in the Ranch that a cash 
improvement escrow was in place "when, in fact, the escrow funds 
were never collected." [Pltfs.' Brief at 17.] Even assuming that 
these allegations are true,4 this does not constitute misconduct 
in receiving or disbursing funds deposited with First Title. 
George assumed the obligation of funding the Improvement Escrow on 
behalf of Cedar Creek. First Title's duty, as escrow agent, was to 
disburse any funds received from George to third parties that made 
improvements on the Ranch. The checks George gave to First Title 
were never cleared by the bank on whose account they were drawn. 
Consequently, First Title never received any funds from George to 
be deposited in the Improvement Escrow under § 31A-23-308 and, 
therefore, First Title did not disburse any funds and could not 
have misallocated, misdirected or embezzled any such funds as 
required to impose vicarious liability on Stewart under § 31A-23-
308. Furthermore, no title policies or commitments were issued 
specifically in connection with the Ranch Improvement Escrow, a 
necessary condition for liability under § 31A-23-308. 
Finally, plaintiffs claim that First Title improperly paid 
part of Rredco Realty's sales commission on the Lava Pointe II 
closing to third parties. [Pltfs.' Brief at 17.] As plaintiffs 
acknowledge, however, this was done pursuant to specific 
4Plaintiffs' record citations do not support their 
allegations. Nowhere in "R.396, Exhibits M,' x5'" and MR.555" is 
there evidence that First Title made any such representations. 
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instructions from Rredco Realty ("Rredco"). [Second Amended 
Complaint, 1 91, R. 610.] Plaintiffs do not claim that Rredco was 
not entitled to the commissions. Nothing in § 31A-23-308 
prohibited Rredco from assigning part or all of its commission to 
any party it desired. First Title was instructed by Rredco how to 
disburse Rredco's commission, and did so. Consequently, First 
Title cannot be said to have misdirected funds for the purposes of 
§ 31A-23-308 in the Lava Pointe II closing. Stewart is not liable 
under § 31A-23-308, therefore, as a matter of law.5 
5The limited legislative history accompanying § 31A-23-308 
likewise does not support plaintiffs' position. Section 31A-23-308 
resulted from a general overhaul of Utah insurance legislation. 
The task force committee that drafted the legislation presented the 
bill to the legislature in a form that included commentary on each 
proposed new section. The commentary to §31A-23-308 states that: 
This section was taken in part from the Maryland 
title insurance code and in part from the 
suggestions from the title insurance committee. 
This section requires underwriters (title insurance 
companies) to assume liability for all errors 
and/or omissions arising from the title insurance 
policies issued by their agents or by themselves in 
the State of Utah. This section provides a 
guarantee [sic] avenue of recourse for the consumer 
of title insurance in the event that the title 
insurance agent or the title search has not been 
properly done. 
[Stewart Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Appendix, R. 
297] (emphasis added) . While the language of § 308 as ultimately 
enacted does not square with the legislature's stated purpose, it 
is consistent with an intention to impose liability only for a very 
specific type of loss. What may be more significant is that the 
legislative history reveals no intention to make title insurance 
companies vicariously liable for all acts of agents who issue title 
policies, whether those acts are related to the issuance of title 
policies or not. 
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Plaintiffs do not claim that First Title mishandled funds 
deposited with it. Rather, the essence of plaintiffs' claim under 
§ 31A-23-308 is that First Title had a duty to be aware of and to 
report the alleged fraudulent conduct of George, plaintiffs' 
partner, in the real estate transactions that First Title handled, 
and that Stewart may be held vicariously liable for First Title's 
breach of this obligation. [Pltfs.' Brief at 18.] As demonstrated 
above, however, § 31A-23-308 makes title insurance companies 
liable, if at all, only for their agent's misconduct in receiving 
or disbursing funds that are deposited with the agent. Nothing in 
§ 31A-23-308 expresses an intent to impose a duty on title 
insurance agents or title insurance companies to warn a party to an 
escrow, settlement or closing of fraudulent conduct by another 
party to the transaction.6 
6It is significant to note that First Title also did not have 
a duty to disclose George's alleged fraudulent conduct at common 
law. At common law, a title agent's duty, when acting as an escrow 
agent, is merely to follow the instructions that the parties have 
formulated in the escrow agreement Nelson v Ashton-Jenkins Co , 
66 Utah 351, 242 P 408 (1925) , Meyers v Rockford Svs. . Inc., 625 
N.E 2d 916, 922 (111 Ct App 1993) (escrow agent has duty to act 
only in accordance with escrow instructions). Consequently, an 
escrow agent is not responsible to inform or give notice to the 
parties to an escrow of any issues or facts extraneous to the 
escrow instructions Barr v Pratt, 804 P.2d 498, 498 (Ore 1991) 
(escrow agent has "no obligation to either party to the transaction 
except to carry out the terms of the escrow instructions"), 
Gebravel v. Transamerica Title Ins Co., 888 P 2d 83, 88 (Ore. Ct. 
App. 1995) (same) In the instant case, plaintiffs have not 
alleged that First Title failed to follow instructions m any 
escrow agreement First Title administered. First Title faithfully 
executed all the instructions in all the escrow agreements at issue 
in this case. 
(continued ) 
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II. PLAINTIFFS' UNJUSTIFIED AND UNDULY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SCOPE OF 
PROVIDE 
CLOSING 
LIABILITY 
PROTECTION 
IMPOSED BY § 31A-23 
TO 
SERVICES SINCE 
CONSUMERS 
ADEQUATE 
OF 
-308 IS 
ESCROW, 
PROTECTIONS 
NOT NECESSARY TO 
SETTLEMENT AND 
ARE ALREADY IN 
PLACE. 
Plaintiffs claim that § 31A-23-308 must be read to make title 
insurance companies liable for any and all misconduct of title 
6(...continued) 
Plaintiffs cite an Arizona case stating an exception to this 
general rule that arises when a title insurance agent knows that a 
fraud is being committed on a participant in an escrow. Contrary 
to plaintiffs' assertions at the trial court, this exception is not 
"widely recognized." See D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE 
§18.3.3 (2d ed. 1993) ("there is a tension in the case law between 
cases imposing a duty to disclose known fraud on the agent, and 
those emphasizing that an agent's duty is only to carry out the 
escrow instructions"). Plaintiffs cite no Utah state court case 
recognizing the exception. If anything, it appears that the Utah 
Supreme Court would reject the exception. 
In Friegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 
(Utah 1987) , the Utah Supreme Court relied on National Bank v. 
Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973) in holding that escrow 
agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals. In National Bank, 
the court concluded that while an escrow agent owes fiduciary 
duties to the escrow principals, these "duties and limitations are 
defined. . . by his or her instructions." Furthermore, in Nelson 
v. Ashton Jenkins Company, 242 P. 408 (Utah 1925) , the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected a claim for the same type of "fraud" claimed by 
plaintiffs in this case --an escrow agent's failure to inform the 
purchaser of a parcel of property of a commission to be paid to a 
party to the escrow. In Nelson, the plaintiff, a purchaser in a 
real estate contract, brought suit against Ashton-Jenkins Company, 
the escrow depository, and its agent Carlquist. Carlquist also 
acted as real estate broker in the transaction. The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendants were liable for failing to disclose an 
agreement between Carlquist and the sellers by which the sellers 
agreed to pay, and did pay, Carlquist any amount over $4000 that 
they received from the transaction. Carlquist had repeatedly 
represented to the plaintiff that the seller was unwilling to lower 
the purchase price below $4,700. In concluding that the defendants 
were not liable for failing to disclose this commission agreement, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he plaintiff received exactly 
what she bought and paid for, and it therefore appears that the 
Ashton-Jenkins Company discharged every obligation imposed upon it 
by the terms of the escrow agreement." Id. at 410. 
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companies in order to ensure that customers of title companies are 
adequately protected. The effect would be to make title insurance 
companies liable as additional errors and omissions insurance 
carriers for title companies. Plaintiffs' argument ignores not 
only the plain language of the statute, but also the myriad 
safeguards already provided to customers of escrow, settlement and 
closing services by law. 
The Utah Legislature has established clear protections for 
consumers of escrow, settlement and closing services. First, Utah 
law requires that each title insurance agent post a $50,000 bond or 
purchase an equivalent professional liability policy in order to 
conduct escrow, settlement and closing services. Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-23-211 (1996) . 
Second, all title insurance agents must maintain a reserve 
fund for the exclusive purpose of settling claims arising from the 
title insurance agent's improper performance in providing escrow, 
settlement or closing services. Id. This reserve fund must 
constitute one percent of the title insurance agent's gross income 
and must be maintained for at least two years after the title 
insurance agent ceases doing business. Id. 
Third, the law requires title insurance agents that also 
conduct escrows, settlements, or closings to meet extensive 
licensing requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) , (6); § 
31A-23-307(1) (1996) . 
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Fourth, the law also requires title insurance agents that 
conduct escrow activities to deposit escrow funds in federally 
insured accounts. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-307 (1996) . 
Regardless of whether these provisions are sufficient to 
protect consumers of escrow, settlement and closing services to 
plaintiffs' liking, it is a legislative function to determine the 
amount of minimum protection that will be provided by the state. 
Section 31A-23-308 is an additional protection but only to a 
limited extent. By its plain language, § 31A-23-308 provides 
protection against a title insurance agent's absconding with, 
misappropriating or misdirecting funds received or disbursed by the 
title insurance agent. It does not, as plaintiffs contend, provide 
protection against all misconduct of a title insurance agent in 
providing escrow, settlement or closing services. It is not the 
function of courts to expand the coverage of a statute beyond its 
plainly stated scope, as plaintiffs would have this Court do in 
relation to § 31A-23-308, in order to alter the regulatory 
framework constructed by the legislature. State v. Maguire, 924 
P.2d 904, 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (court "cannot by construction 
liberalize the statute and enlarge its provisions" since " [w]hen 
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction") (citation 
omitted).7 
7See also Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995) 
(appellate courts have "no power to rewrite a statute to make it 
(continued...) 
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III. STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE AT 
COMMON LAW BECAUSE FIRST TITLE'S ACTUAL AUTHORITY WAS LIMITED 
TO ISSUING STEWART TITLE INSURANCE POLICIES. FIRST TITLE HAD 
NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT ESCROW, SETTLEMENT OR CLOSING 
TRANSACTIONS ON STEWART'S BEHALF. 
Plaintiffs cannot alternately assert that Stewart is 
vicariously liable for the acts of First Title under a theory that 
First Title was Stewart's general agent. In their Second Amended 
Complaint, plaintiffs allege that Stewart is liable under § 31A-23-
305. Section 31A-23-305 states in relevant part: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that every 
insurer is bound by any act of its agent performed 
in this state that is within the scope of the 
agent's actual (express or implied) or apparent 
authority, until the insurer has cancelled the 
agent's appointment and has made reasonable efforts 
to recover from the agent its policy forms and 
other indicia of agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305 (1996). Stewart is not liable under 
this provision as a matter of law. Since, as demonstrated below, 
First Title's actions in performing escrows, settlements and 
closings (presumably the basis of any claim under §31A-23-305)8 
7(...continued) 
conform to an intention not expressed") (citation omitted); Utah 
State Bar v. Summerhavs & Haden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995) 
("[w]hen construing a statute" a court "must determine the 
legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is 
the plain language of the statute") (citations omitted). 
8While plaintiffs do identify as a "wrongdoing" First Title's 
issuing a title insurance policy for $1.6 million on the Ranch when 
the Ranch's purchase price was $1.8 million, plaintiffs do not 
claim to have been damaged by this supposed error nor do plaintiffs 
base any of their causes of action on it. Rather, plaintiffs 
appear to claim that First Title's issuing a title insurance policy 
on the Ranch for $1.6 million is evidence of George's "kickback 
commission." [Pltfs.' Brief at 10, 11.] 
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were not within the scope of First Title's actual or apparent 
agency authority, Stewart is not liable as a matter of law under 
§31A-23-305 or under a common law agency theory of liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that at common law "an 
agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's actions 
unless the agent is acting pursuant to either actual or apparent 
authority." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090, 1094 (Utah 1988) . It is the plaintiffs' burden to prove the 
existence of an agency relationship between Stewart and First Title 
with respect to the escrow transactions at issue. Philip v. 
Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 657 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1983); Calabrese Foundation v. Investment Advisors, 831 F.Supp. 
1507, 1513 (D. Colo. 1993) ("the party claiming an act was done 
within the scope of an agent's authority, has the burden of proving 
that authority"). In this case, plaintiffs cannot meet their 
burden of proving that First Title had actual or apparent authority 
to act as Stewart's agent with respect to the escrow, settlement or 
closing transactions at issue. 
Title companies, like First Title, often are involved in two 
distinct functions: (i) examining title and issuing title insurance 
and (ii) receiving and disbursing money as escrow, settlement, and 
closing agents.9 Title insurance underwriters such as Stewart are 
9A title company's escrow, settlement and closing activities 
are tightly interwoven and functionally indistinguishable as 
demonstrated by the Code's lumping them together in setting out the 
requirements that a title insurance agent must meet in order to 
(continued...) 
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involved in only the first function as underwriters of the title 
insurance policies issued by title companies. The Utah Insurance 
Commissioner treats title and escrow, settlement and closing 
functions separately. In order to perform each categorical 
function, a title company must fulfill distinct licensing 
requirements. See Utah Code. Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) , (6) (1996) 
(providing for separate licensing of title and escrow, settlement 
and closing functions when conducted by title insurance agents). 
Thus, a title company like First Title may be licensed to handle 
title matters, but not to handle escrows, settlements or closings. 
Id. Conversely, a company may be licensed to perform escrow 
functions, but not title functions. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 7-1-501(7), 7-22-101, .et seq. , (1996) (providing for the 
regulation of independent escrow companies). Once these 
distinctions are understood, it is clear that First Title did not 
have agency authority from Stewart to conduct the escrow, 
settlement or closing services at issue in this case. 
9
 ( . ..continued) 
perform activities extraneous to the issuing of title insurance 
policies. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) (1996) ("a title 
insurance agent may not perform the functions of escrow, closing, 
or settlement, unless the agent has been examined on the fiduciary 
duties and procedures involved in those functions"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-23-307 (1996) ("[a] title insurance agent may engage in the 
escrow, settlement, or closing business . . . and operate as a 
escrow, settlement, or closing agent provided that all the 
following exist . . . " ; applying the same requirements to each 
activity). 
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1. First Title's Actual Authority Was Limited to 
Issuing Stewart Title Insurance Policies. 
An agent's actual authority is governed by the relevant 
agreement (or agreements) between the principal and agent. Cameron 
County Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 819 S.W.2d 600, 
602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (examining agency agreement between title 
insurer and purported agent to determine whether agent had actual 
authority from title insurer as to issue unrelated to issuance of 
insurance) . 
In the present case, there is a written Agency Agreement 
between Stewart and First Title that expressly delineates First 
Title's authority. This agreement empowers First Title to act as 
Stewart's agent for the limited purpose of executing title polices. 
The Agency Agreement expressly states that First Title may not hold 
itself out as Stewart's agent for escrow business. By contract, 
First Title did not have actual authority to act as Stewart's agent 
in handling the escrow transactions at issue. 
Furthermore, in each transaction where policies or binders of 
title insurance were issued, the parties paid First Title a title 
insurance premium separate from any escrow, settlement and/or 
closing fees. Likewise, the Agency Agreement provides that Stewart 
is only to be paid a percentage of premiums received by First Title 
for issuing title insurance policies, guarantees, and endorsements. 
Stewart does not receive any compensation from First Title's 
escrow, settlement or closing activities. Consequently, as a 
matter of law, First Title did not have actual authority to conduct 
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the escrow, settlement or closing activities at issue in this case 
as an agent of Stewart. 
2. First Title Did not Have Implied Actual Authority 
to Act as Stewart's Agent in Conducting Escrow, 
Settlement or Closing Activities. 
First Title also did not have implied actual authority to act 
on Stewart's behalf in conducting escrow, settlement or closing 
activities. Implied actual authority consists of: 
[A]uthority to do those acts which are incidental 
to, or necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish 
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated 
to the agent. Implied authority is actual 
authority based upon the premise that whenever 
certain business is confided to an agent, such 
authority carries with it by implication authority 
to do collateral acts which are the natural and 
ordinary incidents of the main act or business 
authorized. 
Zions First Nat'1 Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 
(Utah 1988) (emphasis added). First Title could not have had 
implied actual authority from Stewart to conduct escrow, closing, 
or settlement business since such business was excluded by the 
Agency Agreement between Stewart and First Title. Cameron County 
Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. , 819 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1991) ("since [title insurance agent] had no express 
authority. . . to receive and disburse escrow funds or to close 
real estate sales [on title insurance underwriter's] behalf . . . 
it could have no implied actual authority to do so") . Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that conducting escrow, closing or settlement 
business is necessary to accomplish First Title's expressly 
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delegated task of issuing title insurance policies and commitments 
by which Stewart merely guarantees the state of title. 
As a matter of law, escrow, settlement or closing functions 
cannot be "incidental to, . . . necessary, usual and proper to" the 
accomplishment of expressly delegated title insurance agency 
authority. See Zions, 762 P. 2d at 1094. Utah law requires a 
separate license to perform title and escrow, settlement or closing 
functions. A company may be licensed to issue title insurance, but 
not to carry out escrows, settlements or closings. Consequently, 
it is impossible that escrow, settlement and closing functions are 
"incidental," "usual," or "necessary" to the issuing of title 
insurance. 
3. Stewart Did Not Act in a Manner that Would Give 
First Title Apparent Authority to Perform the 
Escrow, Settlement or Closing Services at Issue in 
this Case. 
In the absence of actual authority, plaintiffs must prove that 
First Title had apparent authority to act for Stewart m handling 
the subject escrow, settlement and closing transactions. To prove 
apparent authority, plaintiffs must show that d) Stewart 
manifested its consent to First Title's exercise of authority or 
knowingly permitted First Title to assume the authority; (n) 
plaintiffs "knew of the facts [manifestation of authority] and, 
acting in good faith, had reason to believe, and did actually 
believe, that the agent possessed such authority," and ( m ) 
plaintiffs, "relying on such appearance of authority," changed 
their position and "will be injured or suffer loss if the act done 
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or transaction executed by" First Title does not bind Stewart. See 
Luddinaton v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) 
(citation omitted). Plaintiffs cannot meet these requirements as 
a matter of law. 
Apparent authority requires "'conduct of the principal which, 
reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the 
principal consents to have the act done on his [or her] behalf by 
the person purporting to act for him [or her] . ' " Luddinaton v. 
Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 27 (1977)). In other words, "an agent's 
apparent authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the 
principal." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P. 2d 
1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). "Apparent authority is not 'apparent' 
simply 'because it looks so to the person with whom [the] agent 
deals.'" Id. (quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-
Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983)). Consequently, an 
individual or entity "who deals exclusively with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite the 
agent's representations." Id. 
Plaintiffs contend that Stewart's name appearing on First 
Title's letterhead, settlement statement forms, and title insurance 
policy forms, all create apparent authority. The fact that 
Stewart's name appeared on title insurance policy forms is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether First Title had apparent 
authority to conduct escrow, settlement or closing activities under 
286598 1 27 
the guise of being Stewart's agent. Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. 
Northland Bldcr. Corp. , 552 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. 1977) (title 
insurer's "approved agent's . . . possession of blank title policy 
form could bear only upon the authority to issue the title policy" 
and agent had no apparent authority in regard to "the closing of 
the entire transaction" between plaintiff and a third party). 
Furthermore, even assuming that Stewart knew that its name 
appeared on settlement statements and on First Title's letterhead, 
and even if plaintiffs knew that Stewart was First Title's 
underwriter, plaintiffs admit that Stewart made no representations 
of any kind to them. Consequently, there is no basis for 
plaintiffs' claim that First Title had apparent authority to act as 
Stewart's agent in conducting escrow, settlement or closing 
activities. As demonstrated above, apparent authority requires 
"'conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes 
the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the 
act done on his [or her] behalf by the person purporting to act for 
[him or her].'" Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209 
(Utah 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 27 (1977)). " [A] n agent's apparent authority flows only 
from the acts and conduct of the principal. " Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988) 
(emphasis added). Thus, where a principal furnished its agent a 
rubber stamp bearing the principal's name and address, the agent 
was not cloaked "with apparent authority to endorse corporate 
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checks and receive payment for them" since "whatever appearance of 
authority the stamp created arose from the actions of [the agent] 
himself and not [the principal] . " Pargas, Inc. v. Estate of 
Taylor, 416 So.2d 1358, 1362 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Phoenix Western 
Holding Corp. v. Gleeson, 500 P.2d 320, 236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) 
(apparent agency authority "must be proved by other evidence before 
his [or her] (the agent's) acts and statements can be shown against 
the principal" and this "rule applies equally to oral statements of 
the agent and the written statements, contained in letters, 
letterheads, receipts, or other documents implying, admitting, or 
claiming authority to act as agent") (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).10 Likewise, in the instant case, any appearance of 
authority of First Title to act as an escrow, settlement or closing 
10See also Boules v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1, 4, 3 (La. 1987) 
(electronics store not liable for agent's taking customer's money 
and failing to deliver purchased merchandise even though agent was 
hired to solicit business at store and had business cards and blank 
sales receipts of store where plaintiffs "failed to prove that 
[store management] manifested apparent authority for [agent] to act 
as the store's agent"); Smith v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 498 So. 
2d 448, 449.50 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (agent's possession of blank 
insurance application forms from alleged principal did not give 
agent apparent authority "to bind" principal thereby compelling 
coverage for plaintiff despite representations by agent that 
coverage existed); CNA Ins. Co. v. Nutone Corp., 461 So. 2d 518, 
521-22 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (construction electrician designated as 
"Authorized Nutone Service Center" by decal on service truck did 
not act with apparent authority in installing Nutone security 
system where service agreement between electrician and Nutone 
authorized electrician to only perform m-warranty repair work and 
not installation, Nutone provided a toll-free telephone number for 
installation and sales of its security system, Nutone received no 
proceeds from electrician's installation and "there was no 
manifestation made by Nutone which would lead the [plaintiffs] to 
believe that [electrician] had the authority to install their 
Nutone system"). 
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agent of Stewart by the appearance of Stewart's name on settlement 
statements and First Title's letterhead was the result of First 
Title's conduct, not Stewart's. Stewart has made no 
representations to plaintiffs causing plaintiffs to believe First 
Title had authority to act as Stewart's escrow, settlement or 
closing agent. Consequently, as a matter of law, First Title did 
not have apparent authority to act as Stewart's agent for escrow, 
settlement or closing purposes. See Smith v. American Auto Ins., 
498 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (" [w]here there has been 
no representation [of agency authority by alleged principal] there 
can be no reliance" sufficient to create apparent agency 
authority). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that plaintiffs made any 
inquiries to First Title or Stewart regarding the extent and scope 
of First Title's authority to act as Stewart's agent. In fact, 
plaintiffs admit they never communicated at all with anyone from 
Stewart Title Guaranty Company regarding any of the transactions at 
issue. As indicated above, since plaintiffs dealt exclusively with 
First Title and not Stewart in relation to the transactions at 
issue in this case, plaintiffs were obligated to ascertain the 
nature and extent of First Title's authority regardless of any 
representations made to plaintiffs by First Title. Zions, 762 P. 2d 
at 1095; see also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) 
("[t]he general rule is that one who deals with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority despite the 
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agent's representations"). Plaintiffs made no attempt to determine 
the nature or extent of First Title's authority to act as Stewart's 
agent and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot now attempt to impose 
vicarious liability on Stewart for First Title's alleged misconduct 
in conducting the escrow activities at issue under either § 31A-23-
3 05 or on the basis of a common law agency theory of liability. 
See Dohrman Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, 103 P.2d 650 (Utah 
1940) (defendant company was not entitled to act "upon the 
assumption" that agent with limited authority had authority to 
settle dispute pursuant to agent's representations where defendant 
did not meet "its burden to determine just how great the agency 
conferred was"). n 
11
 See also Byles Welding & Tractor, Inc. v. McDaniel, 441 So. 
2d 48, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (alleged principal is not liable for 
charges made by agent on principal's open account at equipment 
supply company where plaintiff failed to meet its duty "to inquire 
into the nature and extent of powers of" agent since alleged 
principal "should not be punished" for plaintiff's "lax business 
practices"); Network Management Services Group, Inc. v. Rosen 
Krantz Lyon & Ross, Inc., 211 A.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
("plaintiff, which failed to make the necessary efforts to discover 
the actual authority" of agent "acted at its own peril in assuming 
that [agent] had authority to act" with alleged apparent authority; 
plaintiff's "speculation that some evidence of" agent's alleged 
[apparent] authority may come to light during discovery is 
insufficient to bar summary judgment" in alleged principal's 
favor) . Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Lea, 775 F.Supp. 921, 928 
(E.D. La. 1991) (summary judgment in favor of insurance company on 
grounds of lack of apparent authority of agent where insured "made 
no inquiry whatsoever into the nature and extent of [agent's] 
authority" since "a party seeking to benefit from the doctrine of 
apparent authority may not blindly rely upon the assertions of the 
agent. Rather, he [or she] has a duty to inquire into the nature 
and extent of the agent's power"); Hausam v. Schnasb, 887 P.2d 
1076, 1080 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (summary judgment in favor of 
principal on grounds of lack of apparent authority of agent to bind 
(continued...) 
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Finally, there is no evidence that plaintiffs relied on First 
Title's alleged manifestation of authority in deciding to pursue 
the transactions at issue in this case. Plaintiffs have made no 
allegations, and there is no evidence indicating, that plaintiffs 
would not have engaged First Title to execute the various escrows 
or closings if they had known that First Title was not acting as 
Stewart's agent in performing these functions, as opposed to 
issuing title insurance policies. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot 
meet the required element of reliance in arguing that First Title 
had apparent authority to act as Stewart's escrow, settlement or 
closing agent. See Nappen v. Blanchard, 510 A.2d 324, 329 (N.J. 
1986) (where plaintiffs are merely aware of "approved attorney" 
letter issued to title insurance agent and "at no time have the 
plaintiffs claimed that they relied on the 'approved attorney' 
letter when they entrusted [agent] with their funds . . . the 
necessary element of reliance on the alleged apparent authority" is 
lacking; summary judgment in title insurer's favor on the grounds 
of lack of agency authority) .12 
11
 ( . . .continued) 
principal on promissory note for repayment where plaintiff "lent 
[money] to an entity about which he knew or discovered nothing" 
since a party seeking to hold a principal liable for acts of an 
agent within the scope of the agent's apparent authority must "use 
reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority" which 
"encompasses a duty to inquire with the principal about the agent's 
authority"). 
12
 See also Iowa Nat. Mut. Inc. Co. v. Backens, 186 N.W.2d 196, 
200-20, (Wis. 1971) (plaintiff did not rely on indices of apparent 
authority of service station to "recap" tires as an authorized 
(continued. . . ) 
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The Texas Court of Appeals was recently faced with a title 
insurance agency case with facts very similar to those in the 
instant case. In Cameron County Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Guaranty 
Co., 819 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the plaintiff lent money 
to a buyer to purchase condominiums. The closing documents showed 
that the buyer paid the balance, plus closing costs, in cash when 
in fact the buyer paid no cash, so that only the plaintiff funded 
the sale. The plaintiff contended that the title insurance agent, 
who also conducted the escrow on the transaction, manipulated the 
closing to conceal the buyer's lack of down payment, and that had 
the plaintiff known of the lack of down payment, it would not have 
made the loan. The plaintiff then brought suit against the title 
insurer when the buyer defaulted on the loan. 
In upholding summary judgment in the title insurer's favor on 
the basis that the agency relationship was limited to issuing title 
insurance and did not extend to escrows and closings, the Texas 
Court of Appeals noted that (1) the relevant agency documents 
limited the title insurance agent's authority to issuing title 
policies, (2) the title insurer never held the title insurance 
12
 ( . . . continued) 
recapping agent of tire manufacturer where plaintiff testified he 
had tires recapped at service station merely because "it was 
convenient" and service station owner "was a friend"; judgment in 
favor of manufacturer on grounds of lack of apparent authority 
upheld) ; Hunter Mining Lab, v. Management Assistance, 763 P. 2d 350, 
352-53 (Nev. 1988) (judgment notwithstanding jury verdict in 
defendant's favor on grounds that agent lacked apparent authority 
to act on defendant's behalf upheld where "the record reveals that 
[plaintiff] did not rely on any . . . representations of agency [by 
defendant] when entering into its contracts with" agent). 
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agent out to the public as reliable or trustworthy in the closing 
of real estate transactions, (3) the title insurance agent had no 
authority to act on the title insurer's behalf in conducting 
escrows and closings, (4) the title insurer conducted no business 
except title insurance, and (5) the title insurer received only a 
title insurance premium from the insured. Id. at 603-04. 
Likewise, in the instant case (1) the Amended Agency Agreement 
between First Title and Stewart limited First Title's authority to 
issuing title policies, (2) Stewart never held out First Title as 
its agent to conduct escrow activities, (3) the Amended Agency 
Agreement expressly states that First Title will have no authority 
to act on Stewart's behalf in conducting First Title's escrow 
activities, (4) Stewart engages only in the title insurance, and 
not the escrow business, and (5) Stewart received only a title 
insurance premium from the plaintiffs. [Arlen B. Taylor Aff . at HH 
5,6,7 and Exhibit A, H 11, R. 283.] 
CONCLUSION 
This case concerns disputes between the plaintiffs and their 
real estate development partner, Vernon George. In a nutshell, 
plaintiffs claim they were defrauded by George, and that Stewart's 
title insurance agent, First Title, should have warned plaintiffs 
of the fraud. Stewart's only involvement in these transactions was 
as the title insurer whose policies were issued by First Title in 
the transactions at issue in this case. 
286598 1 34 
A careful review of the statutes argued by plaintiffs to 
impose vicarious liability on Stewart reveals that there is no 
basis for any claims against Stewart. Section 31A-23-308 of the 
Utah Code imposes liability on title companies for the receipt and 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, settlements or closings 
with their title insurance agents. Plaintiffs have not alleged, 
and there is no evidence, that First Title engaged in any 
misconduct in receiving or disbursing funds deposited with it in 
any of the escrow, settlement or closing transactions at issue in 
this case. 
Section 31A-23-305 of the Utah Code purports to "bind" 
insurance companies for the acts of their agents occurring within 
the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. Plaintiffs' 
claims against Stewart for vicarious liability under this provision 
arise out of First Title's conduct in certain escrow, settlement 
and closing transactions. First Title's actual authority was 
limited by contract, however, to issuing Stewart title insurance 
policies. Furthermore, First Title had no apparent authority to 
engage in escrows, settlements or closings on behalf of Stewart. 
Consequently, Stewart cannot be held vicariously liable under § 
31A-23-305, or at common law, as a matter of law. Stewart submits, 
therefore, that the Court should uphold the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in Stewart's favor. 
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Tabl 
31A-23-305. Insurer liability. 
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act 
of its agent performed in this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual 
(express or implied) or apparent authority, until the insurer has cancelled the 
agent*s appointment and has made reasonable efforts to recover from the agent 
its policy forms and other indicia of agency. Reasonable efforts include a formal 
demand in writing for return of the indicia, and notice to the commissioner if 
the agent does not promptly comply with the demand. This subsection neither 
waives any common law defense available to insurers, nor precludes the 
insured from seeking redress against the agent individually or jointly against 
the insurer and agent. 
(2) When a property/liability insurance agent with authority to bind more 
than one insurer on a particular risk agrees to bind coverage on a particular 
risk, but fails to outwardly indicate the insurer with which the risk is placed, 
and before the risk is placed with a particular insurer a loss occurs, if there is 
no conclusive admissible evidence indicating the insurer with which the agent 
exercised his binding authority, a court may equitably apportion the loss 
among all insurers with which the agent had binding authority as to the 
particular type of risk. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-305, enacted by Cross-References.—Presumptions, U.RE. 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, § 200. 301. 
31A-23-308. Liability of title insurers for acts of title 
insurance agents. 
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance agents, is 
directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance agents 
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, closings, or 
settlements with the title insurance agents in all those transactions where a 
commitment or binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title 
insurance company has been issued or distributed. This liability does not 
modify, mitigate, impair, or affect the contractual obligations between the title 
insurance agents and the title insurance company. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-308, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28. 
